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CASE COMMENTS
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS AND NEW YORK PROCEDURE
When a defendant objects to the admission of a confession on the
grounds that it was not voluntarily made, it is the trial judge's duty
in New York, upon request, to hear the evidence upon the question.'
In People v. Tuomey,2 a recent New York decision, the state submit-
ted in evidence a defendant's oral and written confessions, whereupon
defense counsel objected to their admission on the ground that they
were involuntary.3 Defense counsel was accordingly given the oppor-
tunity to make a searching cross-examination as to the voluntariness
of the written confession, but he was denied an examination as to the
oral confession. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed,
holding it to be error to deny a full examination of the circumstances
under which both the oral and written confessions had been obtained.
4
Since the oral confession was immediately reduced to writing, not a
case where the oral confession was alleged to be the product of one
beating and the written of another independent means of coercion,
the dissent urged that an examination as to the voluntariness of the
written transcript of the confession was sufficient. 5
A defendant's protection against the admission of an involuntary
confession involves the application of the rules regulating the hearing
of evidence.0 Therefore, when the procedural safeguards in the trial
court against the admission of coerced confessions are found to be
wanting, apparently technical reversals, as in Tuomey, are not with-
out merit.
In New York, there is no recognized procedure for the suppression,
by pre-trial motion, of an involuntary confession so that the defen-
dant's only opportunity to attack admissibility is by objecting to its
'People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927); People v. Fox, 121 N.Y.
449, 24 N.E. 923 (1890).
2234 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1962).
3Mr. Romanoff, who defended Tuomey on appeal, discloses that during the
trial a motion for a dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the confession
had been illegally and unconstitutionally obtained together with a motion to
exclude the confessions prior to introduction were sought. Counsel also asked for
a hearing outside the presence of the jury. Letter from David Romanoff to Gerald
Kesten, April 2, 1963.
'The court relied upon People v. Holland, 244 App. Div. 287, 279 N.Y.S.
372 (1935).
PApparently the dissent felt that there was but one confession, a written trans-
cript of an oral confession. People v. Tourney, supra note 2, at 321.
GFor a discussion of the various procedural safeguards omitted in the New York
practice under the rule of Stein v. New York, see Meltzer, Involuntary Confes-
sions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev.
317, 338 (1954).
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introduction as evidence in the trial.7 He then may offer evidence
regarding the circumstances under which the confession was obtained,
and vigorously cross-examine the state's witnesses regarding ie
methods by which the confession was acquired.8
Whether the jury is to be present at .this hearing on the admissibil-
ity of a confession presents a crucial question. While the better practice
is to exclude the jury during this hearing, New York law is not entirely
clear on the practice to be followed. In Stein v. New York,9 the United
States Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the New
York practice under which the admissibility of a confession is an
ultimate issue in the case. The practice is explained as follows: (i) If
the trial judge finds the confession to be involuntary, he excludes
the confession and the question of its competency is never presented
to the jury;1° (2) if the trial judge finds a question of fact exists as
to its admissibility, he admits the confession and instructs the jury
to disregard it if the confession is found to be involuntary."1
Consequently, if there are controverted questions of fact, and the
trail judge does not rule the confession inadmissible as a matter of
law, the confession and related evidence will ultimately be submitted
to the jury. Similarly, even though a confession is excluded by the
trial judge, the confession will have been brought to the attention of
the jury. In the latter situation, the defendant is prejudiced in two
ways: (i) It is not unlikely that the jury would find credible what the
judge excluded as incompetent; (2) during the hearing on the con-
fession, the defendant by testifying puts his credibility in issue and
exposes himself to cross-examination and impeachment,1 2 which may
result in a disclosure of his prior criminal record 13 and in effect con-
stitutes a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination.'
4
7People v. Nentarz, 142 Misc. 477, 254 N.Y. Supp 574 (1931).
8People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 85 N.E. 8a9 (igo8); People v. Fiori, 123 App.
Div. 174, io8 N.Y. Supp. 416 (19o8).
'346 U.S. 156 (1953).
"People v. Barbato, 254 N.Y. 17o, 172 N.E. 458 (1930). See, People v. Pignataro,
263 N.Y. 229, 188 N.E. 720 (1934); People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112
(19o9); People v. Meyer, 162 N.Y. 357, 56 N.E. 758 (1900).
11346 U.S. at 177.
'-People v. Sorge, 3o N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (195o); People v. Johnston,
228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E. x86 (1920); People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18, 24, 113 N.E.
538, 540 (1916); Spiegel v. Hayes, 118 N.Y. 66o, 22 N.E. 11o5 (1889); Conners v.
People, 5 N.Y. 240 (1872).
13People v. Nelson, 145 App. Div. 68o, 13o N.Y. Supp. 488 (1911). In the Stein
case each defendant had several prior convictions, therefore none of them testi-
fied on the issue of admissibility. Stein v. New York, supra note 9, at 176.
"'People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18, 113 N.E. 538 (1916). Contra, State v. Thomas,
20o8 La. 548, 23 So. 2d 212 (1945); Hawkins v. State, 193 Miss. 586, 1o So. 2d 678
(1942); Enoch v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 411, 126 S.E. 222 (1925).
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At the trial in Stein none of the defendants requested exclusion
of the jury,'5 so the Court did not have to decide whether the failure
to exclude violated any federal constitutional right. The Court, how-
ever, reviewed the two leading New York cases that have considered
the question. In People v. Brasch,16 the New York Court of Appeals
sustained a ruling whereby the trial judge granted defense counsel's
request for a hearing in the absence of the jury, but on the condition
that defense counsel assure the court that "some legitimate and use-
ful purpose" 17 would be served. Since counsel was unwilling to give
such an assurance, the prosecution was allowed to continue to pre-
sent its case in the jury's presence. In Stein, the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the Brasch case as meaning that "the judge is not
required to exclude the jury while he hears evidence as to voluntari-
ness,"8s an interpretation that goes beyond the precise holding. In
People v. Randazzio,19 the defense counsel's request to remove the
jury was granted, whereupon the testimony of the prosecution's witness
and that of the defendant disclosed a conflict in the evidence as to
whether the police officer had in fact threatened the defendant. Since
this conflict was for the jury's determination, the Court of Appeals
held that it was error for the trial judge to admit the confession as
though its voluntariness had been established. He should have re-
quired the testimony to be repeated in the presence of the jury, and
then submitted for their determination the question of whether
the confession was in fact voluntary. While seemingly a reference to
the trial judge's omission, the opinion from the Court of Appeals
reads:
"Of course, in the trial of civil cases, parties may agree between
themselves to many things pertaining to the conduct of the
trial. They may even dispense with the jury entirely, but in
criminal trials this practice cannot be sanctioned. The pre-
liminary examination of this witness was a part of the evidence
in the case, and should have been taken in the presence of the
jury."
2 0
In Stein, the Supreme Court interpreted the Randazzio case to mean
that "perhaps [in New York, the judge] is not permitted to [exclude
'-"No defendant objected or requested a hearing with the jury absent." 346
US. at 172-73.
1193 N.Y. 46, 85 N.E. 80g (i908).
1785 N.E. at 813.
'8346 U.S. at 172.
"'194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. ii. (igog).
-087 N.E. at 117.
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the jury while he hears evidence as to voluntariness]"; 21 thus the Court
recognized an equivocation in the Randazzio opinion.
Accordingly, one writer cites Randazzio for the rule that the jury's
absence during the hearing on the confession would be error in
New York,22 while a federal district judge gives a contrary inter-
pretation to the case in the recent Application of Jackson.23 In Jack-
son, the petitioner urged that the New York rule for determining
voluntariness of a confession, as outlined in Stein, is violative of due
process. In denying the petition, Judge Dawson, referring to a re-
quest for a preliminary hearing, suggested of the Brasch and Randaz-
zio cases:
"If one had been made it would undoubtedly have been granted
by the trial court, in accordance with the New York rule. De-
fendant, however, apparently preferred to proceed on the basis
of letting everything go before the jury."24
In United States v. Carignan,25 the United States Supreme Court
decided that the defendant was entitled to have the jury excluded in
a federal trial court when he was testifying on the admissibility of
the confession. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why in New
York the absence of the jury during the hearing on -the confession
should be error. For example, the defendant with a prior criminal
record must choose between exposing his discreditable past when
offering testimony of the facts surrounding the admissibility of the
confession, or remain off the stand entirely to keep the evidence of
his previous convictions from the jury.26
In New York, when a judge rules a confession inadmissible he
must instruct the jury to disregard the testimony they have heard re-
garding the confession.2 7 According to the presuppositions underly-
ing the Stein rule, a jury will follow such an instruction. Similarly, in
theory they should be able to disregard evidence of the defendant's
prior convictions brought out by the state's cross-examination. How-
'1346 U.S. at 172.
1Meltzer, supra note 6, at 33o.
22o6 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
MId. at 763.
2324 U.S. 36 (1951).
"6"We now know that each had an impressive felony record, one including
murder and another perjury. Doubtless, to have testified would have resulted in dis-
closing this to the jury, while silence would keep it from being brought to light
until after the verdict." Stein v. New York, supra note 9, at 176.
"In Meltzer, supra note 6, at 332, the author suggests that this practice might
result in the Judge's resolving doubt in favor of voluntariness for purposes of
avoiding a mistrial.
